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Abstract 
This article presents and explores a rich new data source to analyse the determinants of pay 
and job rank amongst academic Economists in the UK. Characteristics associated with 
individual productivity and workplace features are found to be important determinants of the 
relative wage and promotion structure in this sector. However, there is also a substantial 
unexplained gender pay gap.  Men are considerably more likely to work in higher paid job 
ranks where there are also substantial within-rank gender pay gaps. We show that the nature 
of the gender pay gap has changed over the last two decades; but its size has not, suggesting a 
role for suitable policy intervention.  
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1.  Introduction  
The participation of women in UK academic Economics has changed dramatically in the last 
twenty years. Comparison of balanced samples for 1996 (Mumford, 1997) and 2016 (Tenreyro, 
2017) shows that the proportion of this workforce that is female increased from less than one-
in-six in 1996, to more than one-in-four in 2016. Women have improved their relative 
representation in all job ranks over the two decades: from 17% to 35% of the Lecturers; 10% 
to 26% of the Readers/Senior Lecturers/Associate Professors; and from only 4% to 16% of the 
Professors. Canada, America, and Italy have also seen similar trends (see CWEN, 2015; 
CSWEP, 2017; and Corsi  et al., 2016, respectively).  
Despite these gains, women are still comparatively rare amongst academic Economists. 
As a discipline, Economics nestles amongst the Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Mathematics (STEM) disciplines on gender representation comparisons. Ceci et al. (2014) 
show that for the USA in 2011, the percentage of females amongst tenure track academics in 
Economics was higher than in Engineering and the Physical Sciences but below Maths and 
Computer Sciences, and only some half of that in Geoscience. With female Economists 
encountering substantial gender gaps in promotion to tenure (Ginther and Shilamit, 2004) and 
across the job ranks (McDowell et al., 2001; Bandiera et al., 2016).   
The relative under representation of women in academia has been addressed in a series 
of reports investigating the status of women faculty in high prestige institutions, especially the 
early MIT study (MIT, 1999) and subsequent studies at the California Institute of Technology 
(Sargent, 2001); Duke University (Keohane, 2003); and  MIT (MIT, 2011). These studies 
explicitly include discussion of voluntary reforms aimed at improving gender equality such as 
greater awareness of unconscious bias, more equal access to resources, increasing female 
promotion rates and ensuring female participation in governance. It is not clear, however, that 
voluntary programs have been responsible for increased female participation, for example, 
Gregory-Smith (2018) considers the vanguard Athena SWAN positive action program in UK 
medical schools and finds no direct participation effect.  
A pertinent empirical outcome measure of relative equality in the academic labour 
market is the gender pay gap. Ward (2001), in her study of academic pay in Scotland, provides 
a useful survey of early national studies. She concludes that evidence of gender differences in 
salary is typically found although comparisons are difficult due to inconsistent approaches. In 
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probably the first empirical study for Britain, McNabb and Wass (1997) find a raw 
(unconditional) gender pay gap for academics of 15% for 1992. They have a limited range of 
explanatory variables (especially for productivity) but argue some two thirds of this gap can be 
explained. When matching job ranks with McNabb and Wass (1997), Ward (2001) finds an 
unconditional gap of 15% with a gap conditional on explanatory variables of some 3%.  An 
early within-institution study of gender salary differences is provided for Princeton where an 
unconditional gender pay gap at the mean of 18% is found across all faculty in 2002, and a 
conditional gap of 8% once measures of experience and accomplishment are included 
(Tilghman, 2003). A recent (2015) institutional study at the LSE finds an unconditional gender 
pay difference amongst academics of 16.5 log percentage points (lpp) and a gap of 10.5 lpp 
after controlling for age, experience and research productivity (Bandiera et al., 2016). 
It may be argued that women choose to work in low paying disciplines (Ceci et al., 
2014), implying that aggregate (across discipline) studies will generate a spurious gender pay 
gap in favor of males. Discipline specific studies of academic salaries attempt to address this 
concern. Ginther and Hayes (2003) use data from the 1977 to 1995 waves of the US National 
Science Foundation (NSF) longitudinal Survey of Doctoral Recipients (SDR) for academics in 
Humanities disciplines. They find an unconditional gap of around 15 lpp across most of this 
time period with a conditional gap of some 5 lpp in 1977, declining to zero in 1985, and 
remaining small and insignificant thereafter.  
Connolly and Holdcroft (2009) provide a rare study for the UK, they find a gap of 17% 
for UK academics in Medicine in 2006, with close to half of this gap explained (by age, 
experience, career breaks, and high profile job role). Bentley and Adamson (2003) provide a 
survey of studies amongst academic Scientists and Engineers. They find, subject to caveats on 
different approaches and data sets, that conditional (unexplained) gender gaps typically sat in 
the range of 12 to 21% in the 1960s; 5 to 14% in the 1970s and 1980s; with very few studies 
reporting significant gaps from the 1990s. This decline is argued to be partly due to improved 
explanatory variables but may also reflect greater equality in pay setting over time (Ginther 
and Hayes, 2003). Tao (2018) uses five waves of NSF SDR data (2003, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 
2013) to extend the analysis of academic salaries in Science and Engineering. She finds 
unconditional gaps increase slightly from 14 to 17% but conditional gaps remain stable over 
the time period at 4 to 5%. Tao (2018) concludes that conditional (unexplained) gender pay 
gaps for STEM academics are now relatively low and are continuing to decline over time.  
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Studies focusing on the gender pay gap for academic Economists are rare. Blackaby et 
al. (2005) use a 1999 national survey of pay amongst academic Economists in the UK and find 
an unconditional gender salary difference of 17.7 lpp and a conditional gender pay gap of 9.4 
lpp. Ceci et al. (2014) compare unconditional (raw) gender pay gaps for Associate and full 
Professors in the US in 1995 and 2010 for eight disciplines (Economics, Engineering, 
Geoscience, Life Science, Mathematics and Computer Science, Physical Sciences, Psychology, 
and Social Sciences). Strikingly, they find that there was only one significant decline in the 
relative pay of women over this time period; the gender pay gap for full Professors in 
Economics which rose from 5% in 1995 to 25% in 2010.  
As with many developed countries (Blau and Kahn, 2017), the UK has introduced a 
range of equal pay legislation (Dickens, 2007) and seen a substantial decrease in gender pay 
differences across its national workforce in recent years. In UK academia, the voluntary Athena 
SWAN (AS) Charter was established in 2005 to advance the careers of women working in in 
STEM disciplines in Higher Education1. In May 2015, the Charter was broadened to recognize 
work undertaken in all disciplines. The mean UK full-time unconditional gender pay gap has 
fallen from 21% in 2004 to 18.7% in 2011; and further to 16% in 2015 (Butcher et al., 2017; 
page 36). We might expect to see a fall in the gender pay gap amongst academic Economists 
in the UK as well.  
Contemporary studies of the relative position of women in academia tend to provide 
detailed analysis of what may be considered components in the determination of salary. For 
example, gender differences in the production and recognition of quality (Sarsons, 2017) and/or 
quantity of research publications (Aiston, 2014; Joeks et al., 2014; Eagan and Garvey, 2015; 
Krapf et al., 2017); marriage and promotion (Mason et al., 2013); applying for, and being 
awarded, research grants (Marsh et al., 2011); and mentoring and career progression (Blau et 
al., 2010).  However, these studies do not include direct information on salaries.  
A snapshot of recent research providing examples of differences in the way male and 
female economists are trained, supported and critiqued was presented at the 2018 American 
1 The STEM Equity Achievement (SEA Change) program is a similar incentivising awards-based program 
currently being developed in America (see https://www.aaas.org/news/sea-change-program-aims-transform-
diversity-efforts-stem). 
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Economic Association (AEA) meetings. Stevenson and Zlotnick (2018) find that women are 
greatly underrepresented in leading introductory Economics textbooks, with women receiving 
less than a quarter of gendered mentions. We might expect economists trained from these texts 
to stereotype the genders differently in the discipline. Porter and Serra (2017) find that female 
Economics students are particularly sensitive (to even a single 15 minute exposure) to a 
positive female role model in their introductory lectures; those with such exposure to a role 
model are twice as likely to continue into intermediate classes (see also Avilova and Goldin, 
2017). Wu (2017) explores anonymous contributions to the Economics Job Market Rumors 
(EJMR) forum and finds evidence of gendered stereotyped language for women; participants 
are more likely to deviate from an academic focus when women have been mentioned; and 
women are 45% less likely to occur in an Academic/Professional thread and more than twice 
as likely on an Personal/Physical thread than men. Hengel (2018) finds that peer reviewers are 
considerably more demanding of female contributions to leading Economics journals resulting 
in a six month longer review process for women. The behaviours demonstrated in these studies 
are consistent with an environment where it is very possible for academic Economists with the 
same characteristics to be rewarded with different pay according to their gender.  
In this paper, we return to consider gender pay differentials for academic Economists, 
across institutions, at a national level. We introduce and employ a particularly rich source of 
new data generated by the authors from surveying academic Economists in 2016, collecting 
information on individual characteristics and on the workplaces they are employed in.  These 
data are further combined with institutional information collected from the Royal Economic 
Society (RES) Women’s Committee Surveys to explore the current determinants of pay and 
job rank for academic Economists in the UK.  
The data are described in section 2 of the paper; section 3 discusses the estimation of 
the earnings function; decomposition analysis is presented in section 4; the probability of being 
in different job ranks is explored in section 5; changes in the gender pay gap over time are 
considered in section 6; and section 7 presents conclusions.  
2.  The 2016 survey data 
Data Collection and the Structure of Pay 
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Information was gathered by the authors from an online survey emailed to individual academic 
staff members via their Heads of Department or similar department contact between February 
26 and March 28, 2016. Contact details for the Heads of Departments were obtained from 
CHUDE (the Conference of Heads of University Departments of Economics). CHUDE was 
established by the Royal Economic Society (RES) in 1987 in collaboration with the Association 
of University Teachers of Economics. The individual staff member’s responses were collated 
automatically via the survey software (Qualtrics) in an anonymised manner. Hard copies of the 
survey were also circulated at the 2016 Royal Economic Society Conference (March 21-23, 
2016. In total, there were 668 responses, however, many had little or no information and may 
have been accessed to simply look at the questionnaire rather than to participate in the survey. 
There were 543 responses providing information on job rank. Given missing information on 
other variables of interest this allowed for the estimation of job rank with 526 observations. 
There was a substantial reduction in the number of respondents who provided salary 
information; 383 did, allowing for the estimation of wage regressions with 367 observations.  
Supplementary institutional information is collected from the RES Women’s 
Committee Survey (Mitka et al., 2015; Tenreyro, 2017). The Women’s Committee Survey 
harvests information from CHUDE listed university department webpages on the individual 
academic staff by grade of employment and gender. These survey entries are then emailed 
biennially to respective institutions for verification. The data used in this paper is clustered at 
the institutional level; all of the empirical analyses presented throughout are consequently 
adjusted for this potential intra-group correlation (Mouton, 1990; Cameron and Miller, 2015).  
The Women’s Committee Survey 2016 (Tenreyro, 2017) suggests there were 2077 
workers across the entire UK academic Economics workforce in 2016. This would imply a 
total response rate for our survey of 32.7% (668/2077) with a useable response rate of 26.1% 
(543/2077), falling to 18.4% for those providing salary information. Online surveys have been 
found to typically have 11% lower response rates relative to traditional survey modes 
(Manfreda et al. 2008) although response rates tend to be higher for surveys directed at specific 
audiences, such as Professional Associations (Vehovar and Manfreda, 2017), and online 
surveys usually have lower measurement errors, particularly on sensitive topics such as income 
or earnings  (Tourangeau et al. 2013). The only other survey that has been sent to individual 
UK academic economists was also sent to the CHUDE list of Heads of Departments to 
distribute to individual department members in 1999 (Blackaby and Frank, 2000). Of the 1600 
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hard copy surveys distributed, 516 individuals completed the survey, a response rate of 32%; 
their job-rank analysis is for 452 individuals (implying a response rate of 28.3%). The 1999 
data are subsequently used in Booth et al., 2005 to explore gender pay gaps; they include 
information on 351 individuals (or a response rate 21.9%) in their earnings estimations. These 
comparisons suggest the 1999 and the 2016 surveys have similar response rates, that are also 
consistent with response rates for other surveys of this type (Vehovar and Manfreda, 2017; see 
also Hamermesh, 2018).   
There are concerns that the sample does not fully reflect the population. This concern 
is obvious in two main places. First, females make up some 43% of our total sample; however, 
Tenreyro (2017) found the proportion of the UK academic Economics workforce that is female 
is only 28%. Second, a little over a third of our sample are Professors, 42.3% of the men and 
28.7% of the women. Tenreyro (2017; Table 1) found 25.5% of the workforce were Professors, 
29.9% of the men and only 14.2% of the women. There is clearly an overrepresentation of 
Professors, especially female, in our sample. The sample accordingly has some 
underrepresentation of Lecturers amongst the women (Tenreyro found 31.8% of women were 
Lecturers, we have 24.2%) and an underrepresentation of Researchers amongst the men (12.2% 
in Tenreyro, 8.6% in our sample). Respondents were informed that they were being surveyed 
to “find out more about the working lives of academic Economists in the UK”. It may be that 
the respondents have a greater awareness of, and greater commitment to, gender equity issues, 
and that this is especially so for senior females. Their greater concentration in the sample may 
have implications when extrapolating our findings to the UK academic Economist population. 
For example, having disproportionately more higher paid women in the sample may suggest 
the gender pay gap is lower than it is for the population of academic Economists. 
One compensation for the over representation of female Professors in the sample is the 
inclusion of a reasonable number of observations in the analysis as there are 45 female 
Professors in the sample (54% of the potential population, Tenreyro 2017). In contrast, 
Blackaby et al. (2005) could include only 7 female Professors in their analysis, although this 
was also 54% of their potential population.  
The measure of annual salary is the current gross full-time equivalent wage for the main 
job, including all salary components such as bonus payments, additional increment payments, 
and weightings (e.g., the London weighting). The majority of this workforce is on a seniority 
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based incremental pay structure. The University and College Union (UCU) publishes a 
recommended 50 point pay spine, however, the pay ladders for job ranks are not uniform across 
institutions. Professorial salaries are not on this pay spine and are instead negotiated between 
the individual and institution. Bonus payments, whilst not rare, are also not uniform across UK 
universities. Of the Russell group universities with the two highest published gender pay gaps 
across their entire workforces (Durham with a 29.3% gap at the median and Warwick with 
23.4%); Durham has only 1.6% of males and 2.15% of female employees receiving bonuses 
whilst Warwick has 22% of males and 27% of females (https://gender-pay-
gap.service.gov.uk/). On average, the UK academic Economists in our sample earn a full-time 
equivalent gross salary of £55,389 at the median in their main job: males average £60,000 and 
females average £52,000. This implies a raw gender pay difference of 15.4% at the median (or 
21% at the mean).2
Most authors adopt the human capital model as the theoretical basis for the earnings 
function (Becker, 1974; Mincer, 1975). This approach will also be used here. It is assumed that 
wages increase with measures related to individual productivity: own education; research 
output and funding; and teaching excellence. The earnings function is augmented with the 
addition of further categories of explanatory variables including: demographic variables which 
may constrain an individual’s choice of jobs (having children, marital status, ethnic 
identification, and age); workplace characteristics that are common to all workers in that 
workplace (working in a stronger research department, regional location, the percentage of 
women in the department, working in an Economics department within a Business School) and 
workplace characteristics that are provided by the workplace but can vary across employees 
within that work location (workplace network available, mentoring, if the workplace is 
perceived to be cooperative, or if the workplace is perceived to be competitive); and a range of 
variables loosely reflecting the individuals response to the labour market (being an external 
appointment, having a career break, working part-time, and attracting outside job offers).  
Individual Characteristics 
2 Summary statistics and variable definitions are provided in Appendix Table A1 (column 1 for the pooled sample, 
column 2 for men, and column 3 for women). Summary statistics for the sample used to analyse job rank are 
provided in Online Annex Table OA1, the average characteristics are very similar to those reported for the 
earnings sample in Table A1. 
9 
Beginning with the demographic variables, the great majority of this workforce classify 
themselves as white (86%), and they are relatively young with an average age of 45. There is 
a difference in the age distribution for men and women, women are more likely to be aged 
below 50 (75% of the women compared to 63% of the men). As discussed above, there are 
incremental salary steps within many of the job ranks in different institutions and, whilst there 
is clearly not a one-to-one relationship between age and academic job-rank, it is important to 
control for age accordingly. Age may also be reflecting productivity-related skills accumulated 
on-the-job when a measure of actual work experience is not included in the earnings function. 
Although, Oster and Hamermesh (1998) argue Economists are more productive when they are 
younger and closer to completing their PhD. We do not have a reliable measure of actual, or 
post-PhD, work experience further complicating the interpretation of the relationship between 
age and salary.  
Three quarters of these academics are married (by which we mean married or living 
together) and more than half have children.  The women are less likely to be married and less 
likely to have children.  If women believe they will be primarily responsible for childcare after 
marriage they may be less willing to incur the necessary investment expenditures for entering 
this occupation (Becker 1985; Summers 2005). There is considerable evidence that women in 
the STEM disciplines are more likely to leave academia, especially during the main 
childbearing years (Connolly and Fuchs, 2009). Gunther and Kahn (2004) argue that the ‘leaky 
pipeline’ effect for Economists is only slightly more common amongst women than men, and 
would result in a tendency to underestimate gender differences in promotion. For those who 
have chosen to enter and stay in academia, the empirical relationship between academic salary 
and being married and/or having children is not clear. For example, Mason et al. (2013) find 
having children has a negative association with female academic career progression but is 
positive for males. Ginther and Hayes (2003) establish a positive and significant promotion 
effect from having children for men; they find married women and mothers are less likely to 
be promoted. In contrast, Wolfinger et al. (2008) argues being a parent increases the likelihood 
of achieving tenure, regardless of the gender of the parent.  
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Considering the measures expected to be positively associated with individual 
productivity and earnings, 62% of the total sample has a first class undergraduate degree3 (more 
so for females than males). Males are more likely to have a PhD (92% compared to 82% of the 
women), and to consider themselves to be better teachers.  Respondents were asked to evaluate 
their teaching according to how their students typically rate the quality of their teaching. There 
is now a substantial literature suggesting that students display bias against female academics 
when evaluating teaching (see Mengel et al., 2018). This may be reflected in the lower average 
reported by females in our sample statistics (19% of men report they are excellent teachers, 
whilst 16% of the women do). Females are considerably more likely to have been awarded 
more than £100,000 in externally funded research grants in the previous 5 years (35% relative 
to 24% for the men). Individuals were asked to provide a REF (Research Excellence 
Framework) style publication score for each of their career best three publications (ranging 
from zero to four), these were averaged into a single mean value. Women report a lower 
average REF style score (self-reported over their three publications) than men.  
It is important to explicitly include productivity measures in the empirical analysis not 
least because there is a mixed literature on the relationship between gender and research 
productivity of academics. Many recent studies find no gender differences (European 
Commission, 2011; Marsh et al., 2011; Aiston, 2014; Eagan and Garvey, 2015). In contrast, 
Krapf et al. (2017) find no relationship between research productivity and fatherhood, but a 
loss of between 2 to 4 years of research output for mothers (of two or three children). We do 
not have a measure of citizenship. Babcock et al. (2017) argue that women are more likely to 
take on citizenship type roles that help the collective but are associated with a lower probability 
of promotion. We might expect including a citizenship measure would lower the estimated 
conditional gender pay gap, although we note that differential acceptance of these roles may 
itself reflect gender stereotyping.  
Workplace Characteristics 
The workplace variables can be divided into those that are constant across all workers in that 
workplace; and those that are associated with the workplace but can vary for different 
individuals working in that location.  Starting with the workplace characteristics which are 
3 Holds a first class UK undergraduate degree or has a grade point average in the top decile if holding an overseas 
undergraduate degree. 
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constant for all those working in that location, women are considerably less common in the 
lower ranked REF departments (those in the lowest quartile of the REF 2014 score distribution) 
and they are slightly more common in the highest ranked REF departments. Women are also 
more likely to work in the “old” universities (those that were awarded their charter prior to the 
substantial movement of former Polytechnic and Central Institutions into the university sector 
in 1992). It is not obvious that old universities are offering benefits, such as family friendly 
work place practices, that might be more attractive to women. Epifanio and Troeger (2013) do 
not find a pattern in the availability of maternity leave or child care provision by the size, 
research intensity or financial resources of Higher Education Institutions in the UK. 
Nevertheless, we might expect the higher ranked research departments and the old institutions 
to provide more facilities which are in general conducive to academic performance and for 
earnings to be higher on this basis.  
Women are also more likely to work with other women (or, alternatively, in a more 
feminised workplace) than are men. The percentage of females in the workplace is taken from 
the RES Women’s Committee survey data for 2014 (Mitka et al., 2015), this avoids potential 
difficulties extrapolating from our sample when calculating this measure. Using this 
institutional measure, the men in our sample are typically working in a workforce that is 23% 
female whilst for women this value is 28%. Working in a more feminised workplace is 
commonly associated with lower salaries (Groshen, 1991) and is often argued to be linked to 
over-crowding and a decrease in bargaining power (Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Leibbrandt 
and List, 2015). Some 17% of the Economists are based within Business Schools; 20% of the 
males and only 14% of the females and most (79%) of the UK academic Economists work in 
England (60% excluding London). Women are more likely to work in London and in Scotland 
than are men. A positive relationship between working in London and earnings is expected not 
least because universities provide a London weighting (an additional salary component to 
partially compensate for the higher costs associated with living in London). 
Considering the within workplace variables, men are more likely to report that there are 
networks in their workplace they can use for advice concerning professional advancement 
(62% of the men compared to 55% of the women). However, some one in five of either gender 
respond that they have “never had an effective mentor for work related advice”. As Sandberg 
(2016, page 70) argues, an effective mentor does not need to be a formally assigned mentor, 
and low earners may be less likely to recognize unofficial but effective mentoring. The 
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relationship between mentoring and salary is not clear in the literature (Quinn, 2012) although 
we might expect a positive relationship in the long run for early career researchers and students 
(Blau et al., 2010; Avilova and Goldin, 2018). It would seem that there are unofficial support 
processes in these workplaces that, whilst relatively commonly available, are operating more 
inclusively for men than women. Women may be less willing to seek out mentoring or 
networks if they lack confidence in their relative abilities and/or fear being judged harshly. 
Women in our sample are considerably more likely to report that they feel their workplace is 
competitive or very competitive (49% relative to 39% for the men).  Neiderle and Versterlund 
(2007) argue that, even with equal ability and productivity, women are more likely to shy away 
from competition than men are. They argue that this gender difference is due to men being 
overconfident in their own abilities and women preferring non-competitive work 
environments.  Interestingly, both genders in our sample report a similar average for believing 
their workplace is cooperative or very cooperative (40% of the men and 38% of the women). 
Cooperation, or active recognition of mutual advantage, has long been associated positively 
with productivity in the labour economics literature (Mas and Moretti, 2009) and increasingly 
so amongst behavioural economists (Bruni and Sugden, 2013).  
Turning to the remaining variables loosely grouped together as labour market related, 
46% of men and 44% of women have received an outside job offer in the previous five years 
and men are more likely to have been appointed from an external position (50% versus 41%). 
These outcomes may be due to many factors (Leibrandt and List, 2015), including the males 
being on average older and in more senior ranks (Artz et al., 2016). We will return to consider 
these issues more fully in the analysis below.  One in ten of the workforce currently works part-
time, and this is much the same for men and women. Whilst we do not have strong priors on 
the relationship between part-time employment and full-time equivalent earnings in this sector, 
previous studies suggest a bimodal relationship across the British economy with high and low 
skill employees choosing to work part-time (Mumford and Smith, 2009).   
3.  Estimating the earnings function. 
There is an enormous literature examining the gender wage differential in the context of the 
human capital model developed by Becker (1975) and Mincer (1974). Following in this 
literature, using semi-logarithmic wage equations, we estimate the earnings equation as: 
 =    +  , () = 0, 	 ∈ (
, , )   (1) 
where Wi is the natural log of the wage, W, for individual i in group l; Xi is a vector of predictors 
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and a constant;  is a residual term; and m represents male; f  female or p pooled group 
membership. We begin our analysis with pooled wage equations for men and women 
(Neumark, 1988).  An indicator variable identifying male group membership is included in the 
pooled model. Estimating the earnings function using ordinary least squares, and allowing for 
clustering at the institutional level throughout, the results are presented in Table 1. 
[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
Pooled Models of Pay 
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the unconditional gender wage gap to be 15.05 lpp, there are 367 
observations in the regression, and the goodness of fit (in this case, the adjusted R-squared) 
measure is low at 2.4%. Additional categories of explanatory variables are added to the model 
from column 1 to column 3 of Table 1. Model 2, adds the individual productivity measures, 
the conditional gender pay gap becomes 12.3 lpp and the model fit improves to 29.7%.  
 Model 3, in column 3, presents our benchmark model including demographic, 
individual productivity, workplace, and labour market related characteristics; the conditional 
gender pay gap is 12.7 lpp and the measure of fit increases considerably to 53%. Considering 
the results in more detail, no significant relationship is found between earnings and ethnicity 
or having children. We find a small, but statistically insignificant, marriage premium of 3.6  
lpp. Age is found to be positively linked with earnings, an extra year of age is associated with 
a 3 lpp pay rise on average. As discussed above, it may be that males and females have different 
relationships between their demographic characteristics and earnings, especially being married 
or having children. We will consider possibilities of this type more fully with gender specific 
analysis below.   
 Having a first class degree, a higher REF style publication score, or being awarded 
more than £100,000 of research income in the previous 5 years are all positively  associated 
with higher earnings. The relationship between having a PhD and earnings is also positive but 
not statistically significant. The size of these relationships are also notable, for example, recent 
large research grants are associated with a 21 lpp higher salary. A negligible, and insignificant, 
association with earnings is found for being an excellent teacher. 
 i
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  Amongst the workplace constant variables, working in a top quartile REF ranked 
department and working in an old university are both positively associated with higher earnings 
as expected, although the relationship with old universities is not significantly different from 
zero. The strong regional effect associated with working in London relative to the omitted 
“other England”, is not surprising as these universities provide a London weighting. However, 
the relative size of this effect is more than twice what we would expect from just the UCU 
recommended London weighting. The percentage of the departmental workforce that is female 
is negatively and insignificantly associated with salary and working in a Business School 
environment has a small (2 lpp) but insignificant pay premium.  
 Of the within workplace characteristics, a substantial negative and significant 
relationship is found between having a professional network available in the workplace and 
earnings. We might expect networks to improve output and wages. It may instead be that 
academic economists are encouraged to join workplace networks in response to their having a 
low wage or that those with lower wages are self-selecting into a network at their workplace. 
None of the other within workplace variables are found to be important in either size or 
significance; this is true for having never had a mentor or believing the workplace environment 
is cooperative (or competitive).  
 Finally, considering the labour market related variables, being an external appointment 
is associated with 6.4 lpp less pay, this variable may be capturing short job tenure, and it may 
also reflect a lack of willingness of previous employees to keep the staff member. In contrast, 
having received a recent outside job offer is strongly significantly related to a 12.9 lpp increase 
in earnings.  We do not find a part-time pay penalty, however, this may be partly due to the 
dichotomous nature of the job ranks using part-time employment amongst academic 
economists; part-time employment is more common amongst Researchers (21%) but also 
amongst the Professors (13.4%).   
Gender Specific Models 
Results from gender specific estimation of Model 3 (benchmark model) are provided in 
columns 1 (for females) and 2 (for males) of Table 2. There are not many statistically 
significant differences across the genders, which might be expected given the comparatively 
small sample sizes (157 women and 210 men). For example, the return to age is considerably 
larger for men than women, however, the difference is not statistically significant. 
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Nevertheless, there are some interesting findings. Amongst the demographic characteristics, 
we find no marriage premium for women, however, marriage is associated with a 13 lpp pay 
premium for men. This is consistent with the finding of Greenhalgh (1980) who found a 10% 
marriage premium for males in Britain. Korneman and Neumark (1991) provide a survey of 
early findings and argue that married men are more likely to receive higher performance ratings 
than single men, and that this is in turn associated with more rapid promotion and higher 
earnings (see also Mason et al., 2013).  
 Considering the characteristics associated with individual productivity, the patterns 
across the genders are not uniform. Women receive lower returns from having a first class 
degree or a PhD and a larger return from higher quality publications, although these coefficients 
are not significantly different. Recent large research grants are strongly positively associated 
with higher earnings for both genders but the extent of this effect is more than twice as large 
for women as men. This is not influenced by the award of these grants being scarcer for women, 
indeed, these grants are more commonly awarded to women than men in this sample (see 
Appendix Table A1). The returns to excellent student teaching evaluations are also 
significantly different across the genders, with women receiving a penalty of some 10 lpp and 
men a premium of 8.7 lpp. As discussed above, there is now a considerable body of literature 
arguing that women are judged more harshly than men on student teaching evaluations (see 
Mengel et al., 2018). Our results suggest that men and women are also rewarded very 
differently for having excellent teaching evaluations.  
 Working part-time is associated with significantly higher wages for men than for 
women, as discussed above, this may be strongly related to job rank and we will return to 
discuss it further in section 5 below. It is particularly interesting that there is no significant 
gender difference in the relationship between receiving an outside job offer and salary. The 
results do not suggest women face lower earnings because employers do not respond to them 
having an outside job offer as fully as they do with men. Instead, the strong positive relationship 
between salary and having received an outside job offer is found to be virtually identical for 
men (13.3 lpp) and women (13.8 lpp). Outside job offers are also relatively evenly distributed 
between the genders (with 46% of men and 44% of women having received such an offer).  
A small (insignificant) gain of 2.5 lpp is found for women from working in an old 
university and a substantial pay gain for men of 13 lpp (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 2, 
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respectively). We can consider this further by splitting the sample between new universities 
and old universities, (these results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table OA2 in the Online 
Annex). A small and insignificant gender pay gap is found in the new universities of 4 lpp, in 
contrast to the conditional 13.8 lpp gap in old universities. With only 42 observations in the 
new universities, however, these findings should perhaps be treated with some caution. We 
also considered dividing the sample between Economists working in Business Schools or not 
(columns 3 and 4 of Table OA2). The male wage premium is higher in a Business School 
environment but not statistically significantly so (see also Sutanto et al., 2014).  
4.  Decomposing the gender earnings gap
Further insight into the gender pay gap across academic Economists in the UK may be provided 
using decomposition analysis (Oaxaca, 1973, Fortin et al., 2011). Following Jann (2008), the 
approach we adopt to apportion the gap in the mean earnings of men and women here is based 
on Neumark (1988) and discussed further in Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) where the reference 
set of parameters is given by the pooled estimates,  , presented in Table 1, column 3.4 The 
decomposition of the mean earnings gap is calculated as: 
 −  = {(  − )}′ + {(′( − ) + ′( − )}     (2) 
where overbar denotes the mean value; the first component  {(  − )}′  is often referred 
to as the explained component reflecting differences in the observed characteristics across the 
genders; the second component {(′( − ) + ′( − )}  is the remaining portion of 
the gender gap which is usually referred to as unexplained,  and  are reported in Table 2, 
columns 1 and 2 respectively, and  and  are reported in Table A1, columns 2 and 3 
respectively. 
4 As discussed in Fortin et al. (2011, pages 32 to 47), it is well-known that the Oaxaca-Blinder approach suffers 
from the index number problem (i.e. the decomposition results are sensitive to the choice of reference group). The 
members of the reference group are assumed to be individuals who are not discriminated against. More commonly, 
there is no reason to assume that only one gender faces discrimination (Jann 2008, pages 456-457). Several 
solutions to this problem have been suggested. Reimers (1983) proposed using the average of the two group 




 ; and Newmark (1988) proposed using the coefficient from a pooled model. The Newmark approach 
can lead to a portion of the unexplained wage gap being transferred to the explained gap. We use the approach 
suggested by Jann (2008), which corrects for this by using the coefficient in the pooled model with a gender 
dummy, that is  =  (see also Fortin (2006) for an application). 
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[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
Aggregate decompositions for the earnings function are presented in the first panel of 
Table 3. The total gender earnings gap is 15.05 lpp in favor of the males, 2.38 lpp (or some 
15.8%) of this gap can be ‘explained’ by females having on average more of those observable 
characteristics associated with lower earnings than do males.  
 The explained component can be further decomposed, see panel 2. Observable 
differences in demographic characteristics across the genders contribute some -4.51 lpp;  
clearly the largest component of the explained pay gap. The demographic component can be 
itself be decomposed into the portion associated with age (-4.25 lpp or 94%), being married (-
0.29 lpp or 6%) and other (ethnicity and having children) which is negligible at 0.03 lpp; where 
only age is found to be statistically significant.  
 There is very little aggregate difference (0.28 lpp) across the genders in the component 
reflecting individual productivity but there are offsetting effects within this grouping. Women 
are more likely, on average, to have a first class degree and higher research income which lower 
the gender gap; whilst they are less likely to have a PhD, higher ranked publications or, to a 
much lesser extent, excellent teaching evaluations which increase the gender pay gap. 
Similarly, the gender differences in average workplace and labour market characteristics tend 
to lower the pay gap, with the exception of women being more likely to work with other 
women, although none of these later relationships are significant at standard confidence levels. 
In aggregate, despite the considerably younger female workforce, the explained component of 
the gender pay gap is small and not significantly different from zero. 
 The remaining 12.67 lpp (or 84.2% of the total gender pay gap) is unexplained and is 
due to the characteristics (as estimated in the benchmark model) being rewarded, in aggregate, 
at a lower rate for women than for men (differences in the estimated coefficients). The results 
for the more detailed decompositions of this unexplained component are perhaps not surprising 
given our earlier analysis of the separate gender earnings functions in section 3. In terms of 
relative size, the demographic variables dominate with the higher male return to age and the 
male marriage wage premium making up most of this portion. The individual productivity 
measures again tend to offset each other, although not necessarily consistently with the 
explained component. For example, women are more likely to have a first class degree but 
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receive a lower reward for having one. A further notable result is the influence from differences 
in the reward for teaching excellence across the genders. Differential returns from workplace 
characteristics are a further important component of the pay gap; with women earning less in 
more feminized workplaces, and in the old universities. Finally, differences in returns to the 
labour market characteristics do not make a large difference in the gender pay gap (2.8 lpp in 
total) and is mostly related to the part-time pay penalty for women. To emphasize, the model 
does not explain why males and females may be being rewarded differently for the same 
characteristic (hence the term ‘unexplained’) but in aggregate this component of the gender 
pay gap is substantial and strongly statistically significant.  
5.  Gender Differences in Job Ranks 
As discussed in the Introduction, job-rank and promotion differences are important to the 
discussion of gender pay inequality in academia. McDowell et al. (2001) use panel data for 
American Economic Association (AEA) members to consider gender differences in promotion 
in 1964, 1974, 1985, and 1989; using ordered probit analysis and controlling for self-selection 
into academia. They find women face substantially higher promotion hurdles than men at all 
job ranks between 1964 and the early 1980s, however, this disadvantage falls away by the late 
1980s. Ginther and Hayes (2003) find gender earnings gaps for academics in the Humanities 
decline over time (1977 to 1995), and that this is especially true when considering within job-
rank salary differentials. They conclude that most of the remaining gender salary gap in 
Humanities is related to an unexplained 7 percentage point (pp) lower probability of women to 
be promoted.  
Arguably, job rank should not be included in the earnings function due to obvious 
endogeneity concerns, nevertheless, it may allow for further insight into the gender pay gap. 
Comparing results for our benchmark earnings function with the addition of job rank (column 
3 of Table 2) and without (column 3 of Table 1) shows that including job rank lowers the 
conditional gender pay gap from 12.7 lpp to 6.6 lpp (or by 48%). As a crude indicator, this 
suggests that roughly half the gender pay gap is related to between rank (women having lower 
probabilities of being promoted), and half is related to within-rank, differences. The size of the 
relationships between the individual productivity measures and earnings also typically halve 
as does having had a recent outside job offer. We next consider possible between and within-
rank differences in more detail.  
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Following McDowell et al. (2001), we adopt an ordered probit estimation method to 
consider promotion across job ranks. It is assumed that job rank reflects a latent variable (s*) 
dependent on observed characteristics (X) and an unobserved component (ε) for academic i. 
∗ =  +        (3) 
where   = ( ∗) is a step function taking category values according to  ∗ crossing a set of 
threshold levels (Wooldridge, 2002; page 504).  The category values are set to the job ranks 
we consider, from Teaching Fellow through to Professor.5
Results from the ordered probit estimation of job rank for the pooled job rank sample 
of 526 individuals are presented in Table 4. Panel 1 of Table 4 presents the male unconditional 
marginal effect at the means and shows that gender is related to job rank for academic 
Economists in the UK. Comparing Lecturers (column 3) with Professors (column 5): males are 
6.7 pp less likely to be employed as Lecturers and they are 19.3 pp more likely to be Professors.   
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
 Panel 2 of Table 4 presents selected ordered probit estimates for Model 3 from section 
3 (full results are provided in the Online Annex Table OA3). The overall goodness of fit 
measure is not high (pseudo R2 of 22.1%), nevertheless, this is consistent with estimations of 
this type. The conditional gender difference in promotion to Professor is almost half the 
unconditional difference (10.97 pp compared to 19.27 pp, comparing the first rows of panel 2 
and panel 1).   Being married, older, having a first class degree, having a PhD, higher 
publication score, receiving more than £100,000 in research income, excellent teaching score, 
and having an outside offer in the last 5 years are generally negatively associated with lower 
job ranks, and positively associated with higher job ranks. Whilst being an external appointee 
or working part-time tends to be positively associated with lower ranks and negatively with 
higher ranks. These relationships are not, however, always statistically significant. These 
results are all consistent with the findings from the estimation of the earnings function when 
5 It has been standard practice to use ordered probit estimation in this area of the literature. It may be argued, 
however, that in a national study (such as ours) there is a potential tradeoff between job rank and institutional 
prestige. In which case, as suggested by an anonymous referee, the multinomial logit response model may be 
more suitable. The penultimate rows of Table OA4 in the Online Annex (panel 3) present conditional gender 
promotion gap results from multinomial logit estimation of Model 3 (full results are available upon request). 
Comparing results from ordered probit estimation of this model (panel 2 of Table OA4) with multinomial 
estimation (panel 3) suggests the probability of men being promoted to Lecturer is lower, however, we do not 
otherwise find qualitative differences between the results and choose to focus on the more readily comparable 
ordered probit estimation. 
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job rank was included (see Table 1). There are also some interesting standalone findings.  For 
example, not being white is associated with a 6.6 pp lower probability of being a Professor,  
Selected results from separate ordered probit analysis for women and men are provided 
in Table 56 and reveal that the ethnicity relationship is only relevant amongst women; non-
white women are 10.8 pp less likely to be Professors and 11.4 pp more likely to be Researchers 
than white women. Analogously, the association between marriage and promotion is negligible 
for women, while for men being married is associated with a 15 pp lower probability of being 
a Lecturer and 21 pp higher chance of being a Professor. Amongst the Professors, the positive 
association between individual productive characteristics and promotion are shown by both 
genders, however, the returns to each of these characteristics are typically twice as high for 
men as women. Having had a recent outside job offer is also positively associated with being 
a Professor for both genders, although males who have received an outside offer in the previous 
five years are some 50% more likely to be a Professor than are women who have. There is also 
a very clear promotion difference for women and men in the old universities: women working 
in old universities are 14.7 pp less likely to be Professors. The promotion pattern across ranks 
is reversed, but not well determined, for men.  
[TABLE 5 AROUND HERE]  
 We have established clear gender differences in the probability of being promoted to a 
higher rank, however, there may not be within-rank gender pay gaps. Re-estimating Model 3 
(the benchmark model) earnings equation in section 3 for each job rank reveals the conditional 
gender pay gap amongst Lecturers is 4.9 lpp but insignificantly different from zero and it is 
11.5 lpp for Professors (see Table 6, full results are provided in Table OA5 of the Online 
Annex). This conclusion is broadly consistent with Bandiera et al. (2016) who find the pay gap 
increases with seniority for academics at the LSE:  at the Assistant Professor (Lecturer) level 
the within rank gender gap is small at around 2% and insignificantly different from zero, whilst 
the gap is 11% amongst Professors.7
[TABLE 6 AROUND HERE] 
6 Additional results and job ranks are included in the Online Annex Tables OA6 (for women) and OA7 (for men). 
7 Bandiera et al. (2016) also find that women have a slower promotion path at the LSE; tracking a cohort of starters 
in 1998, 24% of the male cohort are Professors after 15 years but only 11% of the women. 
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6.  Changes in the conditional gender pay gap for UK academic Economists over time   
Our study focuses on new data for a single cross section of UK academic economists in 2016 
and, as such, does not allow for an intertemporal analysis. The results may be compared with 
Blackaby et al. (2005), however, their data (discussed in section 2 above) are no longer 
available and so a direct comparison cannot be performed with the new 2016 data. Results for 
a closer approximation of our model to the simpler specification used in Blackaby et al. (2005) 
are provided in Table 7, the conditional gender pay gap in 2016 is found to be larger than that 
found by Blackaby et al. in 1999 (10.5 lpp relative to 9.4 lpp). It is worth stressing how striking 
this finding is; in contrast to the other academic disciplines discussed above, between 1999 and 
2016 there is no notable fall in the unexplained (conditional) gender pay gap for UK academic 
Economists.   
[TABLE 7 AROUND HERE] 
Blackaby et al. (2005) find the within-rank gender pay gap in 1999 is half as big for 
Professors at it is for Lecturers, we find a clearly insignificant gender gap of 3 lpp amongst 
Lecturers in 2016 but a significant gender pay gap of 12.6 lpp amongst Professors.  The gender 
gap amongst Professors in 2016 is four times larger than it is for Lecturers. The within-rank 
gender pay gap has changed dramatically over time: diminishing for Lecturers whilst 
increasing substantially amongst Professors. Furthermore, considering promotion, Blackaby et 
al. (2005) found males were 13.8 pp less likely to be Lecturers and 7.4 pp more likely to be 
Professors in 1999; we find males are 7 pp less likely to be Lecturers and 11 pp more likely to 
be Professors in 2016 (with 99% confidence, see Table 4). Men are less rare amongst the 
Lecturers and they are considerably more likely to be Professors in 2016 than they were in 
1999. 
There are also some interesting changes over time related to particular characteristics.8
Of particular note, Blackaby et al. (2005; Table 6) find women incurred a 9 to 10 lpp penalty 
from having had an outside job offer whilst men receive a 3 to 6 lpp pay gain. They do not 
8 For example, Blackaby and Frank (2000) found an 8 lpp pay penalty for Black and/or Asian academic 
Economists in the UK in 1999; using a comparable ethnicity measure we find a statistically insignificant 3.7 lpp 
penalty. Blackaby et al., (2005) find no ethnic difference in promotion, whilst we find non-white women are 11 
pp less likely to be Professors than are other women, with no equivalent relationship for males. 
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include outside job offers as an explanatory variable in their analysis of job rank. In contrast, 
our gender specific analysis  reveals  the wage return for outside job offers is the same for men 
and women in 2016, but men with these offers are considerably more likely to be promoted 
than are the women.  
 To summarise, in 1999 the gender pay gap was driven by women disproportionately 
working in lower paid ranks (especially Lecturers) where women also faced within-rank gender 
pay gaps. In contrast, the gender pay gap for UK academic economists in 2016 is strongly 
influenced by the relative concentration of men amongst Professors where the unexplained 
gender pay differential is now considerable.   
7. Concluding comments    
The relative position of women in academic Economics has changed dramatically over the last 
two decades, nevertheless, in 2016 women held only 16% of the Chairs in the UK. Unlike the 
STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) disciplines with similarly low 
female participation rates, Economics has attracted very little attention from university 
governing bodies or publicly funded institutions seeking to address potential gender inequities 
and facilitate female engagement.  
The gender pay gap is a pertinent empirical outcome measure of relative equality in the 
academic labour market. We present and employ a particularly rich source of new data obtained 
by surveying UK academic Economists in 2016, collecting information on individual 
characteristics and the workplaces they are employed in to explore the current determinants of 
pay and job rank. We find a substantial unconditional gender pay gap of 15.05 log percentage 
points (lpp) and a conditional gap of 12.67 lpp. Decomposition analysis reveals that the great 
majority of the gap is related to men receiving higher returns from being older or married; and 
from workplace characteristics. We find little explanation of the gap from measures of 
individual productivity, although men (positively) and women (negatively) are rewarded very 
differently for having excellent teaching evaluations. 
Job rank is found to be an important determinant of the gender pay gap. Roughly half 
of the conditional gap is related to within-rank pay differences and the other half due to 
differences in the probability for women of promotion into higher ranks. We find men are 11 
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percentage points (pp) more likely than women to be a Professor and 7.2 pp less likely to be a 
Lecturer, and that male Professors earn 11.5 lpp more than do female. Amongst Professors, the 
positive association between individual productivity characteristics and promotion are 
typically twice as high for men as women. Men who have received an outside offer in the 
previous five years are some 50% more likely to be a Professor than are women who have. And 
women, unlike men, working in old universities are more (less) likely to be in lower (higher) 
ranked jobs. 
In contrast to national gender pay gaps, and evidence from other disciplines, the 
conditional pay gap amongst academic Economists in the UK has not fallen since the turn of 
the century. The gap is substantial, and it is strongly influenced by the relative concentration 
of men amongst Professors where the unexplained gender pay differential is considerable.  
            From 2017, organizations in the UK with 250 or more employers are legally required 
to publish their gender pay gap annually (https://gender-pay-gap.service.gov.uk/actions-to-
close-the-gap) and the Equality Challenge Unit provides advice on how to go about reducing 
these gaps at the institutional level (Government Equalities Office, 2016). The extension of the 
Athena SWAN (AS) Charter across disciplines in 2015 should help to provide greater 
consciousness and linkage between gender equity at the department and the institutional 
(University) level for academic Economists. Furthermore, the specific commitment in the AS 
Charter to “tackling the gender pay gap” will increase institutional awareness of within-
department gender pay gaps.  
Our results imply that universities need to reconsider the implementation of their equal 
pay policies in Economics Departments, especially in the old universities. We show that men 
and women receive substantially different rewards for the same characteristics; detailed pay 
and promotion reviews at the institution level for the senior rank holders should help to reveal 
this differential treatment and indicate appropriate adjustments. Adjusting the salary of female 
Professors in a one off uplift (as the well intentioned Vice Chancellor at the University of Essex 
did in 2016) to close the Professorial pay gap will be of limited effect, not least because our 
results suggest women are 11pp less likely to be promoted to Professor. Implementing pay and 
promotion reviews, however, without recognizing the unconscious bias and institutional 
cultures that have led to the current outcomes will also be of limited use.  
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Professional bodies can play an important role introducing and promoting cultural 
change across a discipline. The Professional Societies in the STEM disciplines have had a long-
term relationship with the AS Charter in the UK. This collaboration has allowed for more 
effective guidance of how to introduce and measure cultural change from the Equality 
Challenge Unit into academia, and has also allowed for a greater extension of good practice 
across activities organized by professional bodies off-campus (such as at conference). The 
Royal Economic Society (RES) has a long history of supporting diversity and seeking to 
improve the position of women in the discipline. It has also recently moved to encourage a 
culture shift away from any form of harassment at, or in connection with, any RES activity 
(RES 2019, page 24).  Nevertheless, we find that the gender pay gap for academic Economists 
has not fallen in the last two decades in the UK. The RES could consider doing more to address 
the gender pay gap. For example, the RES could associate more closely with the AS Charter to 
help induce cultural shift and good practice within departments. The RES could also adopt 
more direct engagement, such as encouraging Vice-Chancellors to provide information on the 
gender pay gap amongst Economists in their institution and their plans to induce more equitable 
treatment.  
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Table 1. The Determinants of Log Earnings (OLS estimates).  
Dependent variable is ln(salary)     (1)     (2)     (3)  
male 0.1505** 0.1226** 0.1267*** 
(0.0608) (0.0465) (0.0430) 
non-white   -0.0028 
  (0.0383) 
married   0.0357 
  (0.0388) 
children   -0.0050 
  (0.0364) 
age   0.0300* 
  (0.0171) 
age squared   -0.0001 
  (0.0002) 
first class degree  0.0343 0.0954*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0250) 
PhD  0.1665*** 0.1013 
(0.0582) (0.0624) 
publication score  0.0964*** 0.0429*** 
(0.0188) (0.0143) 
research income > 100  0.2761*** 0.2167*** 
(0.0415) (0.0423) 
excellent teaching score  -0.0195 0.0055 
(0.0627) (0.0600) 
REF GPA (ommitted group: not a REF dept and lowest quartile) 
   2nd quartile   0.0677 
(0.0697) 
   3rd quartile   0.0009 
(0.0542) 
   4th quartile   0.2017*** 
(0.0589) 
old university   0.1053 
(0.0654) 
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Table 1. The Determinants of Log Earnings (OLS estimates), contined. 
Dependent variable is                             (1)               
ln(salary) 
(2)   (3)  
Region (omitted: England excluding London) 
   London   0.1165** 
(0.0504) 
   Scotland   0.0689 
(0.0690) 
   Wales/N. Ireland   -0.1441 
(0.0922) 
% staff female   -0.0044 
(0.0028) 
wp network   -0.1086*** 
(0.0350) 
no mentor   -0.0171 
(0.0465) 
competitive   -0.0260 
(0.0319) 
cooperative   0.0068 
(0.0262) 
business school   0.0214 
(0.0736) 
external appointment   -0.0639* 
(0.0347) 
career break   -0.0014 
(0.0349) 
part-time   0.0506 
(0.0592) 
outside offers in last 5 years   0.1289*** 
(0.0370) 
constant 10.9259*** 10.4769*** 9.5070*** 
(0.0381) (0.0628) (0.3877) 
Obs 367 367 367 
R-squared 0.027 0.308 0.563 
Adj. R-squared 0.024 0.297 0.527 
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the institution level). * p<0.10  **  
p<0.05   *** p<0.01.  
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Table 2. The Determinants of Log Earnings (OLS estimates). 
Dependent variable is ln(salary)    (1)      
women 
  (2)         
 men 
   (3)     
pooled 
male   0.0659* 
(0.0380) 
non-white -0.0774 0.0335 0.0186 
(0.0585) (0.0603) (0.0292) 
married -0.0386 0.1282** -0.0163
(0.0600) (0.0610) (0.0332) 
children -0.0330 -0.0085 0.0161
(0.0487) (0.0512) (0.0267) 
age 0.0216 0.0370* 0.0247**
(0.0256) (0.0188) (0.0123) 
age squared -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
first class degree 0.0607 0.0857** 0.0437
(0.0443) (0.0346) (0.0293) 
PhD 0.0824 0.1143 0.0133
(0.0921) (0.0899) (0.0440) 
publication score 0.0607*** 0.0303 0.0229**
(0.0220) (0.0197) (0.0105) 
research income > 100 0.2922*** 0.1427** 0.1049***
(0.0505) (0.0630) (0.0393) 
excellent teaching score -0.0978 0.0873 -0.0305 
(0.0817) (0.0618) (0.0401) 
Rank (Researcher omitted)   0.6540*** 
   Professor   (0.0823) 
  0.2381*** 
   SL/Reader   (0.0853) 
  0.0791 
   Lecturer   (0.0905) 
  -0.1206 
   Teaching Fellow   (0.1133) 
  0.6540*** 
REF GPA (omitted group: not a REF dept and lowest quartile) 
   2nd quartile 0.1838** -0.0378 0.0857*
(0.0697) (0.0779) (0.0506) 
   3rd quartile 0.0427 -0.0155 0.0344
(0.0514) (0.0830) (0.0456) 
   4th quartile 0.1320* 0.2235** 0.1905***
(0.0675) (0.0907) (0.0544) 
old university 0.0251 0.1306* 0.0584 
(0.0705) (0.0711) (0.0516) 
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Table 2. The Determinants of Log Earnings (OLS estimates), continued.
Dependent variable is ln(salary)  (1)      
women 
  (2)         
 men 
    (3)       
  pooled 
Region (omitted: England excluding London) 
   London 0.0743 0.2339** 0.1284***
(0.0592) (0.0906) (0.0452)
   Scotland 0.0624 0.0738 0.0631
(0.0744) (0.0857) (0.0448)
   Wales/N. Ireland -0.1747 -0.1224 -0.1357*
(0.1493) (0.0917) (0.0742)
% staff female -0.0070** -0.0014 -0.0025
(0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0022)
wp network -0.0927 -0.1348** -0.0591***
(0.0610) (0.0600) (0.0220) 
no mentor 0.0332 -0.0661 -0.0167 
(0.0610) (0.0698) (0.0344) 
competitive -0.0278 -0.0022 -0.0169
(0.0458) (0.0471) (0.0281) 
cooperative 0.0228 -0.0046 -0.0191 
(0.0410) (0.0455) (0.0234) 
business school -0.0159 0.0603 0.0070 
(0.0921) (0.0747) (0.0589) 
external appointment -0.0345 -0.0566 -0.0014 
(0.0446) (0.0399) (0.0244) 
career break -0.0162 -0.0095 0.0092
(0.0491) (0.0402) (0.0275) 
part-time -0.0912 0.1737* 0.1161** 
(0.0685) (0.1020) (0.0460) 
outside offers in last 5 years 0.1377** 0.1331*** 0.0554** 
(0.0548) (0.0497) (0.0277) 
constant 9.9346*** 9.3326*** 9.8113*** 
(0.5261) (0.4463) (0.2870) 
Obs 157 210 367 
R-squared 0.607 0.594 0.755 
Adj. R-squared 0.525 0.534 0.731 
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the institution level). * p<0.10  ** p<0.05   
*** p<0.01. Coefficient pairs in italics are significantly different at the 90% confidence 
level; in italics and bold are significantly different at the 95% confidence level. 
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Table 3. Decomposing the gender pay gap.   
ln(salary) Comp. Std. Err. 
Difference -0.1505 0.0537 *** 
Explained -0.0238 0.0411 
Unexplained -0.1267 0.0427 *** 
Explained components 
demographic -0.0451 0.0235 * 
    age -0.0425 0.0232 * 
    married -0.0029 0.0034 
    other 0.0003 0.0019 
individual productivity 0.0028 0.0200 
    first class degree 0.0100 0.0047 ** 
    PhD -0.0110 0.0076 
    publication score -0.0194 0.0094 ** 
    research income 0.0233 0.0116 ** 
    excellent teaching score -0.0001 0.0015  
workplace 0.0147 0.0248 
    fem share -0.0196 0.0129  
     old university 0.0082 0.0058  
     other 0.0261 0.0192  
labour market 0.0038 0.0066 
    part time 0.0010 0.0020 
    other 0.0028 0.0059 
Unexplained components 
demographic -0.5462 0.6037 
     age -0.3947 0.5987 
    married -0.1243 0.0642 * 
    other -0.0273 0.0380  
individual productivity 0.0349 0.1378 
    first class degree -0.0181 0.0357 
    PhD -0.0275 0.1056 
    publication score 0.0676 0.0659 
    research income 0.0444 0.0244 * 
    excellent teaching score -0.0316 0.0115 *** 
workplace -0.1951 0.1749 
    fem share -0.1421 0.1120  
    old university -0.0961 0.0768  
    other 0.0431 0.0996   
labour market -0.0222 0.0464 
    part time -0.0280 0.0120 ** 
    other     0.0058 0.0443 
constant 0.6020 0.5748 
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the institution level). * 
p<0.10  ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01. Models include all the explanatory 
variables included in Model 3 as presented in column 3 of Table 1. 
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Table 4. Academic Ranking (Marginal Effects at Means), Selected Results. 
 Teaching Fellow Researcher Lecturer SL/Reader Professor 
Ordered Probit     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
Panel 1. (unconditional) 
male  -0.0460*** -0.0928*** -0.0674*** 0.0135* 0.1927*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0258) (0.0152) (0.0077) (0.0325) 
Obs 526 526 526 526 526 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0204     
Panel 2. (conditional) 
male  -0.0056** -0.0471** -0.0717*** 0.0147* 0.1097*** 
(0.0028) (0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0082) (0.0347) 
non-white 0.0039 0.0309 0.0433* -0.0124 -0.0657** 
(0.0029) (0.0188) (0.0228) (0.0095) (0.0333) 
married -0.0044 -0.0352* -0.0508** 0.0131 0.0772** 
(0.0030) (0.0209) (0.0253) (0.0091) (0.0383) 
age -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0013 0.0002 0.0020 
(0.0009) (0.0074) (0.0119) (0.0021) (0.0181) 
first class degree -0.0025 -0.0216 -0.0334 0.0067 0.0508 
(0.0022) (0.0204) (0.0263) (0.0074) (0.0409) 
PhD -0.0200** -0.1174*** -0.1157*** 0.0687** 0.1843*** 
(0.0092) (0.0404) (0.0280) (0.0267) (0.0348) 
publication score -0.0021* -0.0187*** -0.0299*** 0.0052* 0.0455*** 
(0.0011) (0.0065) (0.0092) (0.0027) (0.0132) 
research income > 100 -0.0053* -0.0509*** -0.0932** 0.0027 0.1467** 
(0.0031) (0.0154) (0.0452) (0.0097) (0.0651) 
excellent teaching score -0.0024 -0.0226 -0.0393 0.0036 0.0608 
(0.0020) (0.0208) (0.0358) (0.0033) (0.0565) 
old university 0.0017 0.0162 0.0277 -0.0030 -0.0426 
(0.0021) (0.0183) (0.0351) (0.0026) (0.0536) 
external appointment 0.0039 0.0332** 0.0519** -0.0096 -0.0793** 
(0.0024) (0.0156) (0.0262) (0.0060) (0.0370) 
part-time 0.0225** 0.1270*** 0.1184*** -0.0767** -0.1912*** 
(0.0114) (0.0453) (0.0336) (0.0352) (0.0407) 
outside offers in last 5 years -0.0059** -0.0522** -0.0859*** 0.0111 0.1329*** 
(0.0027) (0.0206) (0.0275) (0.0070) (0.0430) 
Obs 526 526 526 526 526 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2221     
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the institution level). * p<0.10  ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01. 
Models in  panel 2 include all the explanatory variables included in Model 3 as presented in column 3 
of Table 1. 
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Table 5. Academic Ranking (Marginal Effects at Means), Selected Results by Gender.  
 Researcher Lecturer Professor  Researcher Lecturer Professor 
Ordered Probit     (1)    (2)    (3)     (4)    (5)      (6) 
 Women  Men 
non-white 0.1137** 0.0334 -0.1083*** -0.0027 -0.0110 0.0175 
(0.0460) (0.0242) (0.0376) (0.0099) (0.0420) (0.0680) 
married 0.0039 0.0022 -0.0047 -0.0506* -0.1497*** 0.2091*** 
(0.0385) (0.0223) (0.0468) (0.0262) (0.0532) (0.0659) 
children -0.0100 -0.0056 0.0120 -0.0005 -0.0018 0.0029 
(0.0360) (0.0207) (0.0433) (0.0088) (0.0357) (0.0561) 
age 0.0073 0.0040 -0.0087 -0.0014 -0.0058 0.0090 
(0.0192) (0.0109) (0.0230) (0.0038) (0.0152) (0.0239) 
first class degree -0.0224 -0.0118 0.0262 -0.0097 -0.0383 0.0598 
(0.0463) (0.0224) (0.0514) (0.0098) (0.0339) (0.0512) 
PhD -0.1665* -0.0313 0.1461*** -0.0775 -0.1826** 0.2369*** 
(0.0850) (0.0358) (0.0507) (0.0504) (0.0780) (0.0797) 
publication score -0.0305*** -0.0170* 0.0365*** -0.0095** -0.0381*** 0.0599*** 
(0.0110) (0.0091) (0.0126) (0.0045) (0.0119) (0.0194) 
research income > 100 -0.1143*** -0.0864 0.1663** -0.0147 -0.0647 0.1083 
(0.0358) (0.0589) (0.0727) (0.0101) (0.0530) (0.0936) 
excellent teaching score -0.0031 -0.0017 0.0037 -0.0113 -0.0497 0.0827 
(0.0377) (0.0214) (0.0457) (0.0113) (0.0433) (0.0769) 
old university 0.0918** 0.0804 -0.1465* -0.0055 -0.0210 0.0323 
(0.0363) (0.0565) (0.0775) (0.0130) (0.0466) (0.0697) 
external appointment 0.0064 0.0035 -0.0076 0.0274*** 0.1057** -0.1656*** 
(0.0373) (0.0209) (0.0449) (0.0106) (0.0428) (0.0594) 
part-time 0.1891*** 0.0193 -0.1547*** 0.0412 0.1202 -0.1644* 
(0.0638) (0.0400) (0.0334) (0.0355) (0.0815) (0.0909) 
outside offers in last 5 
years -0.0808* -0.0486 0.1017* -0.0237** -0.0973** 0.1573** 
(0.0091) (0.0301) (0.0560) (0.0105) (0.0406) (0.0624) 
Obs 230 230 230 296 296 296 
Pseudo R-squared 0.373      0.2678   
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the institution level). * p<0.10  ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01. Models 
include all the explanatory variables included in Model 3 as presented in column 3 of Table 1. 
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Table 6. Gender Pay Gap for Academic Ranks (OLS Estimates).  
Dependent variable is ln(salary) Researcher Lecturer SL/Reader Professor 
male -0.1367** 0.0487 0.0415 0.1147* 
(conditional) (0.0573) (0.0545) (0.0398) (0.0619) 
Obs 57 82 82 134 
R-squared 0.874 0.679 0.700 0.504 
Adj. R-squared 0.749 0.509 0.542 0.372 
Table 7.  Gender Pay Gap 1999 and 2016 (Limited Specification)   
 (1)  (2) (3) 
  Full sample  Lecturer Professor 
1999 Blackaby et al. (2005)    
male    0.094***     0.063*** 0.034 
  (3.58)     (2.63)* (0.44) 
Obs 351  133 88 
Adj R-squared 0.64  0.56 0.41 
2016  Blackaby et al. (2005) approximation
male      0.105***  0.030     0.126** 
     (2.83)  (0.577)    (2.12) 
Obs 367  82 134 
Adj R-squared 0.49  0.44 0.24 
  t-statistics in parentheses. * p<0.10  ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01. 
2016 regressions include controls for ethnicity, marriage, age, age squared, UK first class  
degree, PhD, publication quality, research income, excellent teaching, department REF grade  
2014, location, old university, external appointment, and career break. Blackaby  et al.  
(2005) also include controls for non-academic work experience, job tenure and job tenure  
squared. Column (i) from Blackaby  et al. (2005) Table 1, column (iv); column (ii) and (iii) from
Blackaby  et al. (2005) Table 3 columns (iv) and (ii), respectively.  
 Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at institution level). * p<0.10  ** p<0.05   *** 
p<0.01. Models include all the explanatory variables included in Model 3 as presented in 
column 3 of Table 1. 
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Appendix Table A1.  Definitions and Means (Standard Deviations) of Variables 
Means (standard deviations) Definitions 







Total current annual gross salary in GBP (full 
time equivalent. 
natural log salary 11.01 11.08 10.93 
(0.45) (0.48) (0.40) 
Job rank 
Professor 0.37 0.43 0.29 Current academic job rank (if holding more 
than one position, rank of primary 
employment) 
SL/Reader 0.22 0.25 0.18 
Lecturer 0.22 0.21 0.24 
Researcher 0.16 0.09 0.25 
Teaching Fellow 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Demographics 
male 0.57   Respondent is male 
non-white 0.14 0.13 0.14 Ethnic group not white (Mixed/ Multiple;  
Asian/Asian British;  Black/ African/ 
Caribbean/ Black British; or Other) 
married 0.75 0.78 0.7 Married or living together 
children 0.53 0.55 0.5 Has children 
age 20-34  0.22 0.21 0.23
age 35-49 0.46 0.42 0.52
age 50-64 0.28 0.30 0.25
age 65 and above 0.04 0.07 0.00
age  45 46 44 Set at 30 if age group 20-34; 42.5 if age 
group 35-49; 57.5 if age group 50-64; 68 if 
65 and above. 
Productivity measures
first class degree 0.62 0.58 0.68 Has a first class UK undergraduate degree or 
is in top decile for overseas UG degrees 
PhD 0.88 0.92 0.82 Has a PhD 






Average REF type ranking (range: 1-4) of 
three best career outputs (including journal 
publications, working/discussion papers, or 
books) 
research income > 
100 
0.29 0.24 0.35 Received more than £100 k of external 
research funding over the last five years 
excellent teaching 
score 
0.17 0.19 0.16 Teaching ranked as outstanding (self-ranked 
from: 1 - weak; 2; 3; 4; 5 - outstanding) 
Workplace characteristics
REF GPA: not a REF 
dept or 1st quartile 
0.24 0.29 0.19 =1 if not a REF dept or GPA < 2.62 
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Pooled Males Females Definitions 
REF GPA: 2nd 
quartile 
0.24 0.20 0.29 =1 if 2.62 < GPA < 2.93 
REF GPA: 3rd 
quartile 
0.25 0.25 0.24 =1 if 2.93 < GPA < 3.24 
REF GPA: 4th 
quartile 
0.27 0.26 0.28 =1 if GPA > 3.24 
old university 0.89 0.85 0.93 Institutions that were awarded their charter 
prior to the substantial movement of former 
Polytechnic and Central Institutions into the 
university sector in 1992 
Region of institution 
 England (excl. Lond) 0.60 0.62 0.58 
 London 0.19 0.17 0.21 
 Scotland 0.16 0.14 0.18 
 Wales/N. Ireland 0.05 0.07 0.03 










0.59 0.62 0.55 Workplace provides networks that can be 
used for advice concerning professional 
advancement (e.g. conferences, promotion 
advice, research possibilities, etc.) 
no mentor 0.20 0.20 0.19 Have never had an effective mentor for work 
related advice 
competitive 0.43 0.39 0.49 Workplace is competitive (self-identified as 4 
or 5 from: 1 - not at all competitive; 2; 3; 4; 5 
- extremely competitive) 
cooperative 0.39 0.4 0.38 Workplace is cooperative (self-identified as 4 
or 5 from: 1 - not at all cooperative; 2; 3; 4; 5 
- extremely cooperative) 
business school 0.17 0.20 0.14 =1 if workplace is a Business School 
Characteristics related to the labour market
external appointment 0.47 0.5 0.41 Current post appointed from outside the 
current place of employment 
career break 0.59 0.57 0.62 Years in labour market exceeds years in 
academic labour market 
part-time 0.10 0.10 0.11 Current post is on a part-time basis 
outside offer in last 5 
years 
0.45 0.46 0.44 Has received external job offer(s) in the last 5 
years 
Observations 367 210 157  
Mean pairs difference: bold p<0.10, bold and italic p<0.05.
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Online Annex Table OA1. Summary Statistics, Academic Job Rank Sample 
        Pooled  
        Sample   Male Female 
Mean     Mean     Mean 
male 0.56 
non-white 0.14 0.13 0.16 
married 0.74 0.78 0.67 
children 0.52 0.57 0.46 
age 45 47 43 
age 20-34 0.22 0.19 0.26 
age 35-49 0.46 0.42 0.50 
age 50-64 0.28 0.31 0.23 
age 65 and above 0.04 0.09 0.01 
first class degree 0.62 0.57 0.69 
PhD 0.88 0.91 0.84 
publication score 2.21 2.38 1.98 
research income > 100 0.26 0.24 0.28 
excellent teaching score 0.18 0.19 0.16 
REF GPA: 2nd quartile 0.24 0.23 0.26 
REF GPA: 3rd quartile 0.25 0.26 0.24 
REF GPA: 4th quartile 0.25 0.23 0.28 
old university 0.86 0.84 0.89 
institution in England (excl. London) 0.62 0.63 0.59 
institution in London 0.18 0.16 0.20
institution in Scotland 0.15 0.15 0.17 
institution in Wales/N. Ireland 0.05 0.06 0.04 
% staff female 24.96 23.10 27.36 
professional networks available 0.57 0.59 0.54 
no mentor 0.20 0.22 0.18 
competitive 0.41 0.36 0.48 
cooperative 0.39 0.41 0.38 
business school 0.60 0.59 0.61 
external appointment 0.11 0.09 0.12 
career break 0.42 0.43 0.42 
part-time 0.62 0.63 0.59 
outside offer in last 5 years 0.18 0.16 0.20 
Professor 0.36 0.42 0.27 
SL/Reader 0.23 0.27 0.19 
Lecturer 0.23 0.20 0.27 
Researcher 0.14 0.09 0.20 
Teaching Fellow 0.04 0.02 0.07 
observations 526     296     230 
Mean pairs difference: bold p<0.10, bold and italic p<0.05.
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Table OA2. The Determinants of Log Earnings (OLS estimates). 
Dependent variable is ln(salary)    (1)     
   new 
   (2)     
   old 
   (3)       
non-business 
(4)        
business 
male 0.0410 0.1378*** 0.1286** 0.1622
(0.0781) (0.0501) (0.0543) (0.1043) 
non-white 0.0345 -0.0360 0.0024 0.0054 
(0.1383) (0.0378) (0.0420) (0.0867) 
married -0.2446 0.0452 0.0365 0.0644 
(0.2787) (0.0410) (0.0416) (0.1771) 
children 0.1508 -0.0156 -0.0131 -0.0524 
(0.1199) (0.0398) (0.0428) (0.0835) 
age -0.0658* 0.0330* 0.0327* 0.0266
(0.0369) (0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0461) 
age squared 0.0009** -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
first class degree -0.0010 0.0966*** 0.0990*** 0.1758* 
(0.1115) (0.0273) (0.0264) (0.0976) 
PhD 0.3757** 0.0843 0.0977 0.1780
(0.1505) (0.0681) (0.0670) (0.1565) 
publication score 0.0639 0.0476*** 0.0482*** -0.0093 
(0.0415) (0.0153) (0.0167) (0.0275) 
research income > 100 -0.2307 0.2172*** 0.2326*** -0.0962 
(0.1934) (0.0431) (0.0437) (0.2098) 
excellent teaching score 0.2988 -0.0122 0.0018 0.1665
(0.3202) (0.0665) (0.0694) (0.2147) 
   2nd quartile -0.1751 0.1125 0.0999 -0.1928 
(0.2762) (0.0802) (0.0757) (0.1294) 
   3rd quartile 0.0133 0.0222 0.0099 -0.4114 
(0.2880) (0.0573) (0.0550) (0.2609) 
   4th quartile 0.3537 0.2180*** 0.2034*** -0.1017 
(0.2937) (0.0602) (0.0598) (0.1567) 
old university     0.1116 0.2886** 
(0.0912) (0.1127) 
   London 0.0561 0.1316** 0.1035** 0.6355** 
(0.3314) (0.0504) (0.0509) (0.2381) 
   Scotland 0.3748** 0.0688 0.0054 0.2941 
(0.1358) (0.0707) (0.0673) (0.1926) 
   Wales/N. Ireland 0.0914 -0.2710** -0.1855 -0.1719 
(0.1545) (0.1078) (0.1903) (0.1757) 
% staff female -0.0033 -0.0045 -0.0057* -0.0002 
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0052) 
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Table OA2. The Determinants of Log Earnings (OLS estimates), continued. 
Dependent variable is ln(salary)     (1)       
    new 
   (2) 
   old 
   (3)        
non-business 
     (4)         
business 
wp network 0.0640 -0.1196*** -0.0912** -0.1187 
(0.1585) (0.0389) (0.0403) (0.1142) 
no mentor 0.0219 -0.0092 0.0080 -0.1974
(0.1468) (0.0503) (0.0471) (0.1747) 
competitive -0.0059 -0.0332 -0.0332 -0.0602
(0.1082) (0.0325) (0.0335) (0.1226) 
cooperative -0.1056 0.0119 0.0343 -0.1148
(0.1831) (0.0261) (0.0242) (0.1028) 
business school 0.1101 0.0230 
(0.1081) (0.0879) 
external appointment -0.0514 -0.0670* -0.0532 -0.0405 
(0.1704) (0.0380) (0.0387) (0.1188) 
career break 0.2524** -0.0085 0.0013 0.1363
(0.0988) (0.0393) (0.0403) (0.1667) 
part-time -0.0074 0.0340 0.0538 -0.0386 
(0.1947) (0.0678) (0.0645) (0.1677) 
outside offers in last 5 years -0.0327 0.1423*** 0.0988** 0.2256** 
(0.1901) (0.0396) (0.0403) (0.1048) 
constant 11.3490*** 9.5383*** 9.4730*** 9.0725*** 
(0.9141) (0.4160) (0.3904) (1.0764) 
Obs 42 325 303 64 
R-squared 0.731 0.560 0.588 0.641 
Adj. R-squared 0.266 0.520 0.548 0.371 
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the institution level). * p<0.10  ** p<0.05   
*** p<0.01. Coefficient pairs in italics are significantly different at the 90% confidence 
level; in italics and bold are significantly different at the 95% confidence level.  
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Table OA3.  Academic Ranking (Ordered Probit, Marginal Effects at Means).  
 Teaching Fellow Researcher Lecturer SL/Reader Professor
    (i)    (ii)    (iii)    (iv)    (v) 
male -0.0056** -0.0471** -0.0717*** 0.0147* 0.1097***
(0.0028) (0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0082) (0.0347) 
non-white 0.0039 0.0309 0.0433* -0.0124 -0.0657**
(0.0029) (0.0188) (0.0228) (0.0095) (0.0333) 
married -0.0044 -0.0352* -0.0508** 0.0131 0.0772** 
(0.0030) (0.0209) (0.0253) (0.0091) (0.0383) 
children -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0015 0.0003 0.0024 
(0.0016) (0.0136) (0.0218) (0.0038) (0.0331) 
age -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0013 0.0002 0.0020 
(0.0009) (0.0074) (0.0119) (0.0021) (0.0181) 
age squared -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
first class degree -0.0025 -0.0216 -0.0334 0.0067 0.0508 
(0.0022) (0.0204) (0.0263) (0.0074) (0.0409) 
PhD -0.0200** -0.1174*** -0.1157*** 0.0687** 0.1843***
(0.0092) (0.0404) (0.0280) (0.0267) (0.0348) 
publication score -0.0021* -0.0187*** -0.0299*** 0.0052* 0.0455***
(0.0011) (0.0065) (0.0092) (0.0027) (0.0132) 
research income > 100 -0.0053* -0.0509*** -0.0932** 0.0027 0.1467** 
(0.0031) (0.0154) (0.0452) (0.0097) (0.0651) 
excellent teaching score -0.0024 -0.0226 -0.0393 0.0036 0.0608 
(0.0020) (0.0208) (0.0358) (0.0033) (0.0565) 
REF GPA (omitted group: not a REF dept and lowest quartile) 
   2nd quartile -0.0002 -0.0016 -0.0029 0.0002 0.0045 
(0.0016) (0.0155) (0.0282) (0.0017) (0.0436) 
   3rd quartile 0.0012 0.0112 0.0187 -0.0024 -0.0287 
(0.0024) (0.0231) (0.0366) (0.0057) (0.0565) 
   4th quartile 0.0038 0.0316 0.0472 -0.0108 -0.0718 
(0.0027) (0.0240) (0.0320) (0.0086) (0.0493) 
old university 0.0017 0.0162 0.0277 -0.0030 -0.0426 
(0.0021) (0.0183) (0.0351) (0.0026) (0.0536) 
Region (omitted: England excluding London) 
   London -0.0017 -0.0158 -0.0275 0.0025 0.0424 
(0.0019) (0.0171) (0.0304) (0.0026) (0.0477) 
   Scotland 0.0044 0.0331 0.0437 -0.0151 -0.0662 
(0.0037) (0.0281) (0.0316) (0.0150) (0.0471) 
   Wales/N. Ireland -0.0032 -0.0329 -0.0644 -0.0015 0.1020 
(0.0022) (0.0234) (0.0505) (0.0108) (0.0828) 
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Table OA3. Academic Ranking (Ordered Probit, Marginal Effects), continued.   
 Teaching Fellow Researcher Lecturer SL/Reader Professor 
    (1)    (2)   (3)    (4)    (5) 
% staff female 0.0001 0.0009 0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0022 
(0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0018) 
wp network 0.0019 0.0167 0.0270 -0.0044 -0.0413 
(0.0018) (0.0140) (0.0235) (0.0037) (0.0355) 
no mentor 0.0003 0.0028 0.0045 -0.0008 -0.0068 
(0.0024) (0.0211) (0.0327) (0.0063) (0.0498) 
competitive -0.0005 -0.0044 -0.0070 0.0012 0.0106 
(0.0015) (0.0136) (0.0214) (0.0037) (0.0328) 
cooperative -0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0024 0.0004 0.0036 
(0.0020) (0.0172) (0.0277) (0.0047) (0.0423) 
business school -0.0007 -0.0066 -0.0107 0.0016 0.0164 
(0.0018) (0.0170) (0.0274) (0.0037) (0.0425) 
external appointment 0.0039 0.0332** 0.0519** -0.0096 -0.0793** 
(0.0024) (0.0156) (0.0262) (0.0060) (0.0370) 
career break 0.0017 0.0154 0.0250 -0.0039 -0.0383 
(0.0015) (0.0150) (0.0212) (0.0031) (0.0345) 
part-time 0.0225** 0.1270*** 0.1184*** -0.0767** -0.1912***
(0.0114) (0.0453) (0.0336) (0.0352) (0.0407) 
outside offers in last 5 years -0.0059** -0.0522** -0.0859*** 0.0111 0.1329***
(0.0027) (0.0206) (0.0275) (0.0070) (0.0430) 
Obs 526 526 526 526 526 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2221 
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the institution level). * p<0.10  ** p<0.05   *** 
p<0.01. 
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Table OA4. Academic Ranking (Marginal Effects at Means), Selected Results. 
 Teaching Fellow Researcher Lecturer SL/Reader Professor 
     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
1.    Ordered Probit (unconditional) 
male  -0.0460*** -0.0928*** -0.0674*** 0.0135* 0.1927*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0258) (0.0152) (0.0077) (0.0325) 
Obs 526 526 526 526 526 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0204     
2.    Ordered Probit (conditional) 
male  -0.0056** -0.0471** -0.0717*** 0.0147* 0.1097*** 
(conditional) (0.0028) (0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0082) (0.0347) 
Obs 526 526 526 526 526 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2221 
3.   Multinomial Logit (conditional) 
male -0.0002* -0.0485 -0.1301** 0.0647 0.1141* 
(0.0001) (0.0319) (0.0512) (0.0570) (0.0605) 
Obs 526 526 526 526 526 
Pseudo R-squared 0.496     
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the institution level). * p<0.10  ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01. 
Regressions in panels (2) and (3) include all variables from Model 3 in Table 1.  
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Table OA5. Gender Pay Gap for Academic Ranks (OLS Estimates). 
Dependent variable is ln(salary) Researcher Lecturer SL/Reader Professor 
male -0.1367** 0.0487 0.0415 0.1147* 
(0.0573) (0.0545) (0.0398) (0.0619) 
non-white -0.1400*** 0.0691 0.0333 0.0205 
(0.0404) (0.0511) (0.0469) (0.0978) 
married -0.0067 0.0506 -0.0561 -0.0219 
(0.0768) (0.0544) (0.0414) (0.0604) 
children -0.0783 -0.0116 0.0096 0.0020 
(0.0626) (0.0505) (0.0365) (0.0611) 
age -0.0092 0.0127 0.0409* 0.0302 
(0.0302) (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0243) 
age squared 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004* -0.0003 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
first class degree -0.1117 -0.0328 -0.0739* 0.0817* 
(0.0645) (0.0505) (0.0386) (0.0409) 
PhD 0.0996 0.0522 -0.0630 0.0718 
(0.0726) (0.1022) (0.0627) (0.1133) 
publication score 0.0158 0.0106 0.0168 -0.0017 
(0.0189) (0.0157) (0.0141) (0.0275) 
research income > 100 0.1618*** 0.0682 -0.1374 0.0232 
(0.0510) (0.0850) (0.0972) (0.0579) 
excellent teaching score 0.0101 0.0579 0.0189 -0.0573 
(0.1071) (0.0653) (0.0452) (0.0601) 
REF GPA (omitted group: not a REF dept and lowest quartile) 
   2nd quartile 0.2409 0.0287 -0.0255 0.0550 
(0.1494) (0.0486) (0.0273) (0.0767) 
   3rd quartile -0.0049 0.0796 0.0396 0.0608 
(0.1305) (0.0574) (0.0621) (0.0832) 
   4th quartile -0.0111 0.3522*** 0.2532*** 0.2676*** 
(0.1725) (0.1074) (0.0722) (0.0991) 
old university -0.1489 0.0336 0.1561*** -0.1119 
(0.3518) (0.0960) (0.0396) (0.1790) 
Region (omitted: England excluding London) 
   London -0.0754** 0.1637 0.1623*** 0.2083** 
(0.0357) (0.1037) (0.0534) (0.0865) 
   Scotland -0.0469 0.0794 0.0261 0.2154*** 
(0.1494) (0.0481) (0.0496) (0.0740) 
   Wales/N. Ireland 0.4717*** -0.2226** -0.1443* -0.2578* 
(0.1428) (0.1052) (0.0732) (0.1503) 
% staff female -0.0002 -0.0045 -0.0017 -0.0039 
(0.0023) (0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0047) 
wp network 0.1096* -0.0009 0.0271 -0.0860 
(0.0613) (0.0643) (0.0453) (0.0562) 
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Table OA5. Gender Pay Gap for Academic Ranks (OLS Estimates), continued. 
Dependent variable is ln(salary) Researcher Lecturer SL/Reader Professor 
no mentor -0.0057 0.0619 -0.0104 0.0039 
(0.0817) (0.0483) (0.0536) (0.0528) 
competitive 0.0247 0.0904* 0.0431 -0.0849* 
(0.0468) (0.0496) (0.0314) (0.0488) 
cooperative 0.0881* -0.0549 -0.0793 0.0459 
(0.0492) (0.0430) (0.0569) (0.0518) 
business school -0.0235 0.0178 0.0759* 0.0542 
(0.1129) (0.0556) (0.0408) (0.0929) 
external appointment -0.1642*** 0.0297 0.0242 0.0987* 
(0.0490) (0.0649) (0.0433) (0.0510) 
career break 0.0266 -0.0063 0.0881* -0.0137 
(0.0248) (0.0441) (0.0445) (0.0436) 
part-time -0.0195 -0.0401 -0.1988 0.1816** 
(0.0593) (0.0565) (0.1445) (0.0749) 
outside offers in last 5 years -0.0425 0.0093 0.0316 0.1767*** 
(0.0413) (0.0565) (0.0436) (0.0451) 
constant 10.8325*** 10.1219*** 9.7129*** 10.3934*** 
(0.3381) (0.4197) (0.5023) (0.6418) 
Obs 57 82 82 134 
R-squared 0.874 0.679 0.700 0.504 
Adj. R-squared 0.749 0.509 0.542 0.372 
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at institution level). * p<0.10  ** p<0.05   *** 
p<0.01. 
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Table OA6. Academic Ranking (Marginal Effects at Means), Selected Results for 
Women. 
 Teaching Fellow Researcher Lecturer SL/Reader Professor 
Ordered Probit     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
Women 
non-white 0.0299 0.1137** 0.0334 -0.0687** -0.1083*** 
(0.0195) (0.0460) (0.0242) (0.0316) (0.0376) 
married 0.0008 0.0039 0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0047 
(0.0077) (0.0385) (0.0223) (0.0216) (0.0468) 
children -0.0020 -0.0100 -0.0056 0.0055 0.0120 
(0.0073) (0.0360) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0433) 
age 0.0014 0.0073 0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0087 
(0.0038) (0.0192) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0230) 
first class degree -0.0046 -0.0224 -0.0118 0.0127 0.0262 
(0.0095) (0.0463) (0.0224) (0.0261) (0.0514) 
PhD -0.0506 -0.1665* -0.0313 0.1022** 0.1461*** 
(0.0320) (0.0850) (0.0358) (0.0501) (0.0507) 
publication score -0.0061* -0.0305*** -0.0170* 0.0170*** 0.0365*** 
(0.0032) (0.0110) (0.0091) (0.0064) (0.0126) 
research income > 100 -0.0203** -0.1143*** -0.0864 0.0548** 0.1663** 
(0.0102) (0.0358) (0.0589) (0.0224) (0.0727) 
excellent teaching score -0.0006 -0.0031 -0.0017 0.0017 0.0037 
(0.0074) (0.0377) (0.0214) (0.0208) (0.0457) 
old university 0.0148* 0.0918** 0.0804 -0.0404** -0.1465* 
(0.0081) (0.0363) (0.0565) (0.0160) (0.0775) 
external appointment 0.0013 0.0064 0.0035 -0.0036 -0.0076 
(0.0077) (0.0373) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0449) 
part-time 0.0642* 0.1891*** 0.0193 -0.1179*** -0.1547*** 
(0.0333) (0.0638) (0.0400) (0.0431) (0.0334) 
outside offers in last 5 years -0.0159* -0.0808* -0.0486 0.0436* 0.1017* 
(0.0091) (0.0482) (0.0301) (0.0232) (0.0560) 
Obs 230 230 230 230 230 
Pseudo R-squared 0.373         
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the institution level). * p<0.10  ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01. 
Regressions in panels (2) and (3) include all variables from Model 3 in Table 1.  
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Table OA7. Academic Ranking (Marginal Effects at Means), Selected Results for Men. 
 Teaching Fellow Researcher Lecturer SL/Reader Professor 
Ordered Probit     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
Men 
non-white -0.0001 -0.0027 -0.0110 -0.0038 0.0175 
(0.0003) (0.0099) (0.0420) (0.0160) (0.0680) 
married -0.0020 -0.0506* -0.1497*** -0.0068 0.2091*** 
(0.0022) (0.0262) (0.0532) (0.0184) (0.0659) 
children -0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0018 -0.0006 0.0029 
(0.0003) (0.0088) (0.0357) (0.0113) (0.0561) 
age -0.0000 -0.0014 -0.0058 -0.0018 0.0090 
(0.0001) (0.0038) (0.0152) (0.0049) (0.0239) 
first class degree -0.0003 -0.0097 -0.0383 -0.0115 0.0598 
(0.0003) (0.0098) (0.0339) (0.0092) (0.0512) 
PhD -0.0039 -0.0775 -0.1826** 0.0271 0.2369*** 
(0.0041) (0.0504) (0.0780) (0.0496) (0.0797) 
publication score -0.0003 -0.0095** -0.0381*** -0.0121* 0.0599*** 
(0.0002) (0.0045) (0.0119) (0.0065) (0.0194) 
research income > 100 -0.0004 -0.0147 -0.0647 -0.0285 0.1083 
(0.0004) (0.0101) (0.0530) (0.0326) (0.0936) 
excellent teaching score -0.0003 -0.0113 -0.0497 -0.0213 0.0827 
(0.0003) (0.0113) (0.0433) (0.0238) (0.0769) 
old university -0.0002 -0.0055 -0.0210 -0.0057 0.0323 
(0.0004) (0.0130) (0.0466) (0.0103) (0.0697) 
external appointment 0.0008 0.0274*** 0.1057** 0.0317** -0.1656*** 
(0.0008) (0.0106) (0.0428) (0.0161) (0.0594) 
part-time 0.0017 0.0412 0.1202 0.0014 -0.1644* 
(0.0022) (0.0355) (0.0815) (0.0282) (0.0909) 
outside offers in last 5 years -0.0007 -0.0237** -0.0973** -0.0356* 0.1573** 
(0.0006) (0.0105) (0.0406) (0.0192) (0.0624) 
Obs 296 296 296 296 296 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2678         
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the institution level). * p<0.10  ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01. 
Regressions in panels (2) and (3) include all variables from Model 3 in Table 1.  
